Illinois Supreme Court rules social media ban for sex offenders unconstitutional

Conrad Allen Morger was convicted of sexually abusing a minor and sentenced to four years of probation by a district court in McLean County, Illinois, in February 2014. Included in his order was the condition that he not use social media sites such as Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram. Morger’s case reached the Illinois Supreme Court, which, on Nov. 21, 2019, ruled his social media banishment unconstitutional. The decision came under the review of the Illinois Office of the Attorney General, according to The Southern Illinoisan. 

Key Player

Conrad Allen Morger is a registered sex offender convicted of criminal sexual abuse in the state of Illinois. 

Further Details

During oral arguments held in September 2019, Morger’s lawyer, Zachary Rosen, argued that the social media ban violated Morger’s First Amendment right to Free Speech. “Certainly I recognize that there is a government interest here,” said Rosen, “in helping to rehabilitate offenders, in reducing recidivism, and of course keeping our communities safe, particularly our most vulnerable members of our community — children. But as the Illinois statute is written, [the ban] doesn’t meet all of those goals.” 

Six participating justices of the Illinois Supreme Court agreed with Rosen. In a unanimous decision, the court said the ban does not sufficiently contribute to the rehabilitation process, as is the primary goal with probation cases. 

The state’s legal representative, Joshua Schneider, argued that the ban minimizes the “temptation to reoffend,” per the The Southern Illinoisan. However, Morger, a teenager at the time of the offense, did not use the internet to carry out his crimes. Although the Supreme Court agreed that the ban might be effective to rehabilitate offenders proven to have used social media to commit sex crimes, “a host of offenders—[Morger] included—do not fall into that category,” it said.

Outcome

Illinois Supreme Court decides social media ban’s “protective value” does not outweigh “impairment to the probationer’s constitutional rights”

Justice Lloyd Karmeier wrote in the decision that the participating justices were “not persuaded that [the law] provides rehabilitative value … that outweighs, in many circumstances, its detriment to rehabilitation.” Karmeier instead recommended counseling and treatment as better rehabilitative options.